Preparatory Committee for the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

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Implementation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Report submitted by Canada

1. Action 20 of the action plan contained in the Final Document of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons calls for States parties to submit regular reports on the implementation of the action plan, the 13 practical steps towards disarmament contained in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference and article VI, paragraph 4 (c), of the 1995 Review Conference decision entitled "Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament". In line with this commitment, and with a view to enhancing transparency and building confidence, Canada submits this report on its implementation of the Treaty on an article-by-article basis, including the 13 practical steps agreed in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference. It provides updated information that builds upon the reports Canada submitted in 2012 (NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/10) and in 2013 (NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/9). Separate reports have been made on Canada's implementation of the action plan agreed at the 2010 Review Conference and on the implementation of the resolution on the Middle East agreed at the 1995 Treaty Review and Extension Conference. Such comprehensive reporting is not intended to expand the scope of the commitments made, but is a reflection of the linkages that exist among the articles of the Treaty, the 13 practical steps and the 2010 action plan. Canada calls upon all other States parties to submit such comprehensive reports at Treaty meetings.

Article I

2. Canada continues to call upon nuclear-weapon States not to assist, encourage or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Nuclear proliferation continues to pose a threat to the world. Canada maintains that members of the United Nations must work together to ensure that Security Council resolutions are fully implemented and that States work together to halt activities that have no reasonable purpose other than the further acquisition of nuclear weapons.

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3. Canada is a member of the 28 member Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction, an initiative launched at the 2002 summit of the Group of Eight to address the threat posed by the proliferation of weapons and materials of mass destruction as well as related knowledge. To date, Canada has spent C$463 million towards concrete projects through its Global Partnership Programme in support of the non-proliferation and disarmament objectives of the Treaty. Since the 2013 Treaty Preparatory Committee, funding from Canada's Global Partnership Programme was used to provide airborne radiation detection equipment and training to strengthen the on-site inspection capabilities of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization; to fund and manage successful radiological security projects focusing on the Central America, South-East Asia and the Middle East and North Africa regions; support the safeguards verification activities of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), including for the monitoring of the Islamic Republic of Iran's compliance with the joint plan of action; and to oversee and ensure completion of multi-year projects on the physical protection of nuclear materials.

4. Canada is an active participant in the Proliferation Security Initiative, which seeks to enhance, in a manner consistent with national legal authorities and international law, practical cooperation on interdiction of, inter alia, nuclear weapons material and technology flowing illegally to and from States and non-State actors. Canada is also an initial partner nation of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, a member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group and an active participant in the Group of Eight Non-Proliferation Directors Group.

5. Canada continues to actively participate in the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative, a cross-regional group of Treaty non-nuclear weapon States that works to promote and support the implementation of the commitments made by all States parties to the Treaty, particularly the 2010 action plan, and advocate further progress through practical contributions and proposals. Canada welcomed the addition of the Philippines and Nigeria to the group at its September 2013 Ministerial meeting in New York. Canada supported the joint Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative working papers submitted to the 2013 Treaty Preparatory Committee on the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, non-strategic nuclear weapons, reducing the role of nuclear weapons in defence doctrines, export controls, nuclear-weapon-free zones, the wider application of IAEA safeguards and disarmament education. Canada endorsed the group's ministerial statement issued at the ministerial meeting, held in Hiroshima, Japan, on 12 April 2014.

Article II

6. Canada continues to abide by its Treaty commitment not to receive the transfer of, receive control over, manufacture or acquire nuclear weapons or a nuclear explosive capability. This commitment is implemented domestically primarily through Canada's Nuclear Safety and Control Act of 2000 and the Export and Import Permits Act of 1985.

7. Canada calls upon other non-nuclear-weapon States not to receive the transfer of, receive control over, manufacture, acquire or seek to receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or their delivery vehicles. Canada reiterates its call on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to immediately resume cooperation with IAEA inspectors, to comply fully

with all of its obligations under Security Council resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013) and 2094 (2013), and to fulfil all commitments it made as part of previous Six-Party agreements, including abandoning all its nuclear weapons and existing nuclear and ballistic missile programmes and immediately ceasing all related activities. Canada has fully implemented successive Security Council resolutions imposing sanctions on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, and had already adopted comprehensive economic sanctions against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in 2011, including a prohibition on imports from and exports to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, with certain humanitarian exemptions. We continue to support negotiations as the best means to achieve a permanent, peaceful resolution of the Korean peninsula's long-standing security issues and encourage efforts towards the early resumption of this process.

8. Canada continues to urge the Islamic Republic of Iran to comply with all of its international obligations, including those set out by the Security Council and the IAEA Board of Governors, and to engage seriously and without preconditions in efforts aimed at restoring international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of its nuclear programme. This requires immediate and full cooperation with IAEA to address serious concerns about the military dimensions of its nuclear programme and the full implementation of the additional protocol to the IAEA comprehensive safeguards agreement. Canada has fully implemented in Canadian law the requirements of Security Council resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008) and 1929 (2010) by imposing rigorous sanctions on the Islamic Republic of Iran. Canada continues to believe that States parties should explore ways for the 2015 Review Conference to seriously and credibly address the Islamic Republic of Iran's non-compliance with the Treaty.

9. Canada fully supported the IAEA Board of Governors resolution requesting the IAEA Director General to report to the Security Council the assessment that an undeclared nuclear reactor existed at Dair Alzour, Syrian Arab Republic, in breach of that country's safeguards obligations. Canada continues to call on the Syrian Arab Republic to urgently remedy its non-compliance and to meet its own commitment to fully cooperate with the Agency to resolve related outstanding issues, so that the Agency can provide the necessary assurances as to the exclusively peaceful nature of the Syrian Arab Republic's nuclear programme. Canada also continues to urge the Syrian Arab Republic to bring into force an additional protocol as soon as possible.

10. Canada's national export control system is consistent with the lists of those multilateral nuclear export control mechanisms in which it participates and operates in a transparent manner. Canada participated actively in the Nuclear Suppliers Group's list review and is in the process of incorporating the revised lists into national legislation. These measures serve to facilitate peaceful nuclear commerce and international cooperation while ensuring that non-proliferation policies are met. Canada continues to cooperate actively with other like-minded States in a variety of international forums to develop new measures aimed at further strengthening the non-proliferation regime, particularly with regard to the transfer of enrichment and reprocessing technologies, and the suspension of nuclear cooperation in cases of non-compliance with nuclear non-proliferation commitments.

Article III

11. Pursuant to article III, Canada has in place a comprehensive safeguards agreement and an additional protocol to the agreement with IAEA. Canada is of the view that a comprehensive safeguards agreement together with an additional protocol constitutes the safeguards standard required under article III. With this safeguards standard in place, IAEA is in a position to draw an annual conclusion regarding the non-diversion of declared nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities and the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Canada. This broader conclusion first achieved in 2005 and subsequently maintained on an annual basis, provides the highest level of confidence that Canada is in compliance with its commitments under the Treaty. Furthermore, the attainment and maintenance of the broader conclusion has allowed IAEA to fundamentally change the way safeguards are undertaken in Canada, by implementing a State-level integrated safeguards approach. These developments are a direct result of Canada's strong support for the IAEA safeguards system and of the high level of cooperation between IAEA and Canada in the implementation of the comprehensive safeguards agreement and the additional protocol. At IAEA and the General Assembly, Canada continues to urge States that have yet to bring into force a comprehensive safeguards agreement and an additional protocol to do so as soon as possible. Canada supports the outreach efforts of the Group of Eight and the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative to advance the universalization of the additional protocol. In addition, through the Canadian Safeguards Support Programme, Canada contributes to the research, development and support of safeguards equipment and techniques for both domestic and international use aimed at strengthening the effectiveness and efficiency of the Agency's safeguards.

12. Consistent with its obligation not to provide source or special fissionable material, or equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material to any non-nuclear-weapon State for peaceful purposes unless the source or special fissionable material is subject to IAEA safeguards, and with decision 2, paragraph 12, of the 1995 Treaty Review and Extension Conference, all of Canada's nuclear partners have accepted, through a bilateral nuclear cooperation agreement with Canada, a number of additional measures designed to ensure that nuclear items supplied by Canada do not contribute to the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Canada maintains a national system for controlling the export of all items especially designed or prepared for nuclear use and certain nuclear-related dual-use items, including, with respect to the specific requirements of article III, paragraph 2, of the Treaty, source or special fissionable material and equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material. It ensures that exports of nuclear and nuclear dual-use items are not authorized where there is found to be a risk of diversion to a weapons of mass destruction programme or an unsafeguarded facility, or when an export would be otherwise contrary to Canada's non-proliferation policy and international commitments and obligations. Canada's export control legislation includes a catch-all provision.

13. Canada is currently chair of the Zangger Committee, a group of 38 States that maintains a list of nuclear-related strategic goods on which IAEA safeguards are applied.

Article IV

14. Canada strongly supports the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Canada pioneered a pressurized heavy water reactor system, the CANDU nuclear power reactor, that has been successfully exported to four other States parties. Canada maintains a robust domestic nuclear power programme and has a broad and diverse nuclear industry including uranium, radioisotopes for medical, academic and industrial purposes, as well as nuclear reactor services. Canada believes that nuclear energy can make an important contribution to prosperity and sustainable development, while also addressing concerns about climate change. To this end, Canada has 29 nuclear cooperation agreements in force covering 47 States parties to the Treaty, both developed and developing, to provide a framework for the fullest possible exchange of nuclear and other material, equipment and technology. Since the 2013 Treaty Preparatory Committee, Canada concluded a nuclear cooperation agreement with the United Arab Emirates and signed one with Kazakhstan. Canada has also held official bilateral consultations with nuclear cooperation agreement partner States, as well as formal administrative arrangement consultations with nuclear cooperation agreement partner country authorities. Canada strongly supports the IAEA Technical Cooperation Programme, and has made significant voluntary contributions to the IAEA Technical Cooperation Fund. Canada has also actively supported efforts to strengthen the Technical Cooperation Programme to make it more transparent and accountable in a results-based framework. In April 2012, Canada passed legislation to amend its criminal code to improve its approach to prosecute those who commit acts of nuclear terrorism. On 21 November 2013, Canada ratified the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism. On December 3, 2013, Canada ratified the 2005 Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials.

15. In view of the inherent relationship between States' inalienable rights to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and the obligations contained elsewhere in the Treaty, cooperation by Canada with other countries in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy takes fully into account the non-proliferation credentials of the recipient country. Canada is committed to working with other States and relevant international organizations on new arrangements for the supply of nuclear items, consistent with the balance of rights and obligations agreed to in the Treaty and in particular in articles II, III and IV.

16. Canada continues to be involved in and support efforts to assist the harmonized implementation of the IAEA Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources and its supplementary Guidance on the Import and Export of Radioactive Sources. Canada continues to assist the harmonized implementation of the Guidance through the establishment of bilateral administrative arrangements on the import and export of radioactive sources with its foreign regulatory counterparts. Canada has established 12 such arrangements. IAEA has recognized this initiative as a best practice and encourages other States to follow Canada's lead. As one of the world's leading suppliers and exporters of radioactive sources, Canada has a strong interest in the establishment and maintenance of an effective, efficient and harmonized international regime for ensuring their safety and security, including measures to prevent their use in malicious or terrorist acts. Canada encourages all States to implement the provisions of the Code and Guidance in a harmonized manner to assist in providing assurances

that radioactive sources are used and maintained within an appropriate regulatory framework of radiation safety and security.

Article V

17. The Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference affirmed that provisions of article V are to be interpreted in the light of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. Canada signed the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty in September 1996 and ratified it in December 1998. In October 1998, Canada was the first Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty State signatory to sign a facility agreement with the Preparatory Commission of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization to establish the legal basis for activities to construct the monitoring stations to be hosted in Canada. Canada has played an active role in encouraging further signatures and ratification of the Treaty with a view to achieving its universality, including through annual diplomatic outreach efforts conducted by the Group of Eight presidency.

18. Canada co-sponsored General Assembly resolution 68/68 on the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. The resolution calls for the earliest possible entry into force of the Treaty and urges the maintenance of unilateral moratoria on nuclear weapons test explosions until entry into force is achieved.

Article VI

19. Canada continues to take seriously the obligation of article VI and the commitments agreed upon in the 1995 Principles and Objectives, in the 13 practical steps and in the 2010 action plan. These have been at the forefront of a number of activities and statements. Below is a summary of Canada's activities as they relate to the 13 practical steps agreed in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference.

Steps 1 and 2

20. Canada's action in support of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and the moratorium on nuclear testing is described above under article V implementation.

Steps 3 and 4

21. Canada's priority in the Conference on Disarmament is the start of negotiations on a verifiable fissile material cut-off treaty. In May 2013, Canada submitted a report of its views on a fissile material cut-off treaty to the Secretary-General. Canada also conducted démarches in 41 States to encourage them to submit such reports as well. Canada is pleased to chair the Group of Governmental Experts that will meet in 2014 and 2015 to make recommendations on possible aspects that could contribute to, but not negotiate, a fissile material cut-off treaty. Canada regrets that the adoption of a comprehensive programme of work continues to be blocked by one Conference member.

Step 5

22. Canada emphasizes the importance of transparency, irreversibility and verifiability in the reduction and eventual elimination of nuclear weapons arsenals

and facilities. At the sixty-eighth session of the General Assembly, Canada co-sponsored resolution 68/51, entitled "United action towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons".

Step 6

23. At the sixty-eighth session of the General Assembly, Canada voted in favour of resolution 68/39, entitled "Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: accelerating the implementation of nuclear disarmament commitments" and resolution 68/51.

24. As a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Canada continues to advocate that the Alliance play a positive role in advancing disarmament objectives through a continuous step-by-step approach in a manner which increases international peace and stability. NATO's 2010 Strategic Concept clearly stated its commitment "to seek a safer world for all and to create the conditions for a world without nuclear weapons in accordance with the goals of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, in a way that promotes international stability, and is based on the principle of undiminished security for all". This commitment was restated in NATO's Deterrence and Defence Posture Review, released at the 2012 NATO Summit in Chicago, United States of America.

Step 7

25. Canada welcomes the ongoing efforts of the United States and the Russian Federation to implement the Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (New START). We encourage all of the nuclear-weapon States to continue and intensify their efforts to follow-up on the Final Document agreed at the 2010 Review Conference, including their meeting in Beijing on 14 and 15 April 2014.

Step 8

26. Canada has encouraged the Russian Federation and the United States to implement the Trilateral Initiative by placing surplus stocks of fissile material under IAEA control.

Step 9

27. As noted previously, Canada voted in favour of General Assembly resolution 68/39. Canada also supports measures to reduce the operational readiness of nuclear weapons systems in ways that promote international stability and security, as called for in resolution 68/51.

Step 10

28. Through the Global Partnership Programme, Canada is contributing to the elimination and disposition of fissile material, ensuring that it cannot be acquired by terrorists or countries of proliferation concern. Canada strongly supported the communiqué issued at the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit in The Hague and welcomes the goal of securing all vulnerable nuclear materials around the world. At the 2010 Nuclear Security Summit, Prime Minister Harper announced that Canada would contribute C$5 million and C$3 million, respectively, to United States-led

nuclear security projects in Mexico and Viet Nam. These projects involved the conversion of nuclear reactors and the complete removal of highly enriched uranium from these countries. The Mexico project was completed in March 2012 and the Viet Nam project was completed in 2013. Canada is currently working on a joint project with the United States Department of Energy to convert a nuclear reactor in Jamaica to low enriched uranium.

Step 11

29. Canada is party to various conventions, including the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction, the Convention on Cluster Munitions, the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe, the Treaty on Open Skies, the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects and the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies. Canada continues its support to mine action in Asia, Africa, the Middle East, Europe and South America.

Step 12

30. Canada continues to encourage States to submit information about their efforts and activities to implement the Non-Proliferation Treaty as official reports to Preparatory Committee meetings and Review Conferences.

Step 13

31. As mentioned previously, in September 2013 Canada contributed airborne radiation detection equipment and training to strengthen the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization's verification capabilities.

Article VII

32. Canada continues to underline the need to preserve and respect the negative security assurances provided by nuclear-weapon States to non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty through Security Council resolution 984 (1995), relevant treaties that establish nuclear-weapon-free zones and, as applicable, their respective nuclear postures. Canada is not a member of a nuclear-weapon-free zone.

Article VIII

33. The indefinite extension of the Treaty and accompanying decisions adopted in 1995 enshrined the concept of permanence with accountability. In accordance with the commitments arising from the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference and action 20 of the action plan from the Final Document of the 2010 Review Conference, Canada consistently submits at Treaty meetings comprehensive reports on its implementation of the Treaty and agreements from Review Conferences.

34. Canada actively promotes measures to reinforce the authority and integrity of the Treaty and ensure the implementation of its obligations. Canada continues to support efforts to make the institutional structure of the Treaty more responsive, flexible and accountable.

Article IX

35. Canada has consistently worked for the universalization of the Treaty. At the sixty-eighth session of the General Assembly, Canada co-sponsored resolution 68/51, in which the Assembly reaffirmed the importance of the universality of the Treaty and called upon States not parties to the Treaty to accede to it as non-nuclear-weapon States without delay and without conditions. Canada views its position in this regard as consistent with Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) and resolutions 1673 (2006) and 1810 (2008) on the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, in which the Council called upon all States to promote the universal adoption and full implementation of multilateral treaties, the aims of which are to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons.

Article X

36. Canada continues to coordinate a core group of countries at the IAEA General Conference responsible for a resolution on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Since 2006 the Canadian-led core group has annually facilitated the adoption of a resolution to promote the resumption of that country's obligations under the Treaty, including the implementation of its comprehensive safeguards agreement.

37. Canada welcomed the indefinite extension of the Treaty, adopted without a vote in 1995. Negative security assurances provided in 1995 by the five nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty in Security Council resolution 984 (1995) furnished part of the basis for this indefinite extension, as paragraph 8 of the "Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament".

Article XI

38. This report is available in Canada's official languages, English and French, which comprise two of the six official languages of the Treaty text.

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Report submitted by Canada

Action 20 of the action plan contained in the Final Document of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons calls for States parties to submit regular reports on the implementation of the action plan, the 13 practical steps towards disarmament contained in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference, article VI of the Treaty and paragraph 4 (c) of the 1995 Review Conference decision entitled "Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament". In line with this commitment, and with a view to enhancing transparency and building confidence, Canada submits this report on its implementation of the 2010 action plan included in the Final Document of the 2010 Review Conference. It provides information that builds upon the reports Canada submitted at the first and second meetings of the Preparatory Committee for the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/10 and NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/9).

Action 1: Canada's international security policy continues to promote the non-proliferation, reduction and eventual elimination of nuclear weapons.

Action 2: Canada continues to promote the principles of irreversibility, verifiability and transparency in the implementation of Treaty obligations.

Action 3: N/A as this is a commitment for nuclear-weapon States.

Action 4: Canada welcomed the entry into force on 5 February 2011 of the Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms.

Action 5: As a member of the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative, Canada endorsed the group's draft standard reporting form to promote greater transparency with regard to the nuclear stockpiles of the nuclear-weapon State

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parties to the Treaty. This draft reporting form was circulated at the 2012 Preparatory Committee, with working paper NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.12.

Action 6: Canada continues to call upon the Conference on Disarmament to agree on a comprehensive programme of work that addresses all of the core issues on the Conference on Disarmament's agenda.

Action 7: Canada continues to call upon the Conference on Disarmament to agree on a comprehensive programme of work that addresses all of the core issues on the Conference on Disarmament's agenda.

Action 8: N/A as this is a commitment for nuclear-weapon States.

Action 9: While Canada is not a member of a nuclear-weapon-free zone, it supports the convening of a conference on a weapons of mass destruction-free zone in the Middle East.

Action 10: Canada continues to call upon all States that have not yet done so to sign and ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty as soon as possible and without condition.

Action 11: Canada ratified the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty in December 1998.

Action 12: Canada was an active participant at the 2013 Article XIV Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, which took place on 24 September 2013 in New York. Canada joined the consensus on the Final Declaration produced by the Conference.

Action 13: As a part of its 2010 presidency of the Group of Eight, Canada launched an ongoing initiative that makes diplomatic representations on behalf of the Group of Eight in States that had yet to ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.

Action 14: In September 2013, Canada completed a contribution of airborne radiation detection equipment and training to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization to strengthen the Organization's on-site inspection capabilities. Canada continues to promote the completion of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty international monitoring system and development of its on-site inspection capabilities. Canada hosts 16 stations and laboratories that are a part of the international monitoring system. All of the facilities hosted by Canada were completed and certified by the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization by November 2009.

Action 15: In May 2013, Canada submitted to the Secretary-General a report of its views on a fissile material cut-off treaty as requested in General Assembly resolution 67/53, led by Canada, entitled "Treaty banning the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices". Canada also conducted diplomatic representations in 41 States to encourage them to provide reports on the fissile material cut-off treaty to the Secretary-General. Canada is pleased to chair the Group of Governmental Experts that will meet in 2014 and 2015 to make recommendations on possible aspects that could contribute to, but not negotiate, a fissile material cut-off treaty.

Action 16: N/A as this is a commitment for nuclear-weapon States.

Action 17: Canada supports the development of appropriate legally binding verification arrangements to ensure that fissile material designated as no longer required for military purposes is irreversibly removed.

Action 18: Canada does not operate any facility that produces fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

Action 19: Canada continues to support increasing confidence, improving transparency and developing efficient verification capabilities related to nuclear disarmament.

Action 20: Canada continues to encourage all States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to submit information about their efforts and activities to implement the Treaty and all relevant agreements at Review Conferences as official reports to Preparatory Committee meetings and Review Conferences. Such reports are vital to strengthen the principle of "permanence with accountability" that underpinned the Treaty's indefinite extension in 1995.

Action 21: As a member of the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative, Canada endorsed the group's draft standard reporting form to promote greater transparency with regard to the nuclear stockpiles of the nuclear-weapon State parties to the Treaty.

Action 22: Since 2003, Canada, through the Department of Foreign Affairs, International Trade and Development's International Security Research and Outreach Programme, has collaborated with a Canadian non-governmental organization on an annual graduate research awards competition. The programme aims to engage post-graduate students at Canadian universities on select issues on the international security agenda, particularly nuclear non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament. In 2010, the project was expanded to include a presentation and debate of research papers by award recipients at an event attended by Canadian officials and the Canadian expert community. On 10 and 11 April 2014, two Canadian students participated in the youth exchange programme that took place in Hiroshima, Japan, on the margins of the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative Ministerial meeting.

Action 23: Canada continues to call upon States that have not yet done so to accede to the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States, and calls on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to resume adherence to the Treaty.

Action 24: Pursuant to article III, Canada has in place a comprehensive safeguards agreement and additional protocol with the (International Atomic Energy Agency) IAEA.

Action 25: We urge all States that have not yet done so to complete and implement a comprehensive safeguards agreement and additional protocol with IAEA which we view as the safeguards standard required under article III.

Action 26: With Canada's comprehensive safeguards agreement and additional protocol in place, IAEA has reached annual conclusions regarding the non-diversion of declared nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities and the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Canada. This broader conclusion was first achieved in 2005 and has been maintained on an annual basis. It provides the highest level of confidence that Canada is in compliance with its commitments under the Treaty. Furthermore, the attainment and maintenance of the broader

conclusion has allowed IAEA to fundamentally change the way safeguards are applied in Canada, by implementing a State-level integrated safeguards approach. These developments are a direct result of Canada's strong support for the IAEA safeguards system and of the high level of cooperation between IAEA and Canada in the implementation of the comprehensive safeguards agreement and the additional protocol.

Action 27: Canada is in full compliance with its safeguards obligations and is in full conformity with the IAEA Statute. Canada continues to use its Board of Governors membership to direct IAEA to resolve cases of non-compliance with safeguards obligations.

Action 28: In support of IAEA efforts to strengthen the safeguards system, Canada brought into force a protocol additional to its safeguards agreement on 8 September 2000. Canada has provided updates to its declaration pursuant to article II of the protocol on an annual basis and has provided complementary access to IAEA inspectors under the provisions of article V. We urge States that have yet to do so to conclude and bring into force an additional protocol with IAEA.

Action 29: In February 2013, the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative sent joint letters to key States to urge them to complete and implement an Additional Protocol agreement with IAEA. Canada supports the ongoing Group of Eight initiative to make diplomatic representations to advance the universalization of the additional protocol.

Action 30: N/A as this is a commitment for nuclear-weapon States.

Action 31: N/A as this is a commitment for States with a small quantities protocol.

Action 32: Canada regularly assesses the status of its safeguards to ensure that they are as effective and efficient as possible, and implements all decisions adopted by IAEA policy bodies.

Action 33: Canada continues to provide the fullest possible political, technical and financial support to IAEA. Canada consistently provides experts to IAEA technical working groups, supports the Director General and secretariat, pays its assessed contributions on time and in full, has contributed significant extrabudgetary funding to the Agency's Safeguards Department on an annual basis.

Action 34: Through the Canadian Safeguards Support Programme, Canada contributes to the research, development and support of safeguards equipment and techniques for both domestic and international use aimed at strengthening the effectiveness and efficiency of the Agency's safeguards. This effort resulted in an average annual contribution of approximately C$1 million over the last three fiscal years and included the further development of equipment for the verification of spent fuel assemblies at light water reactors and its adaptation for use at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant, new systems for the monitoring of on-load refuelled reactors, development of laser technology for nuclear material identification, and support for improving the IAEA's processes in drawing safeguards conclusions.

Action 35: Consistent with its obligation not to provide source or special fissionable material, or equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material to any non-nuclear-weapon State for peaceful purposes unless the source or special

fissionable material is subject to IAEA safeguards, and with decision 2, paragraph 12, of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, all of Canada's nuclear partners have accepted, through a bilateral nuclear cooperation agreement with Canada, a number of additional measures designed to ensure that nuclear items supplied by Canada do not contribute to the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Action 36: Canada's national export control system is consistent with the lists of those multilateral nuclear export control mechanisms in which it participates. Canada participated actively in the Nuclear Suppliers Group's list review and is in the process of incorporating the revised lists into national legislation. These measures ensure that nuclear non-proliferation policies are met, while facilitating peaceful nuclear commerce and international cooperation. At the 2013 Preparatory Committee meeting, Canada co-sponsored a working paper by the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative on export controls, which included recommendations for consideration at the 2015 Review Conference.

Action 37: Canada maintains a national system for controlling the export of all items especially designed or prepared for nuclear use and certain nuclear-related dual-use items. It also ensures that exports of nuclear and nuclear-related dual-use items are not authorized where there is found to be an unacceptable risk of diversion to a weapons of mass destruction programme or an unsafeguarded facility, or when an export would be otherwise contrary to Canada's non-proliferation policy and international commitments and obligations.

Action 38: Canada supports the legitimate right of all States parties to full access to nuclear material, equipment and technological information for peaceful purposes. Canada negotiates nuclear cooperation agreements with States parties, including developing countries, to facilitate mutually beneficial exchanges for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

Action 39: In view of the inherent relationship between States parties' inalienable rights to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and the obligations contained elsewhere in the Treaty, cooperation by Canada with other countries in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy takes fully into account the non-proliferation credentials of the recipient country.

Action 40: Canada remains committed to maintaining the highest possible standards of security and physical protection of nuclear materials and facilities. Canada achieves effective physical protection at the domestic level through a robust regulatory framework which integrates relevant safety, security and safeguard elements, the implementation of strong physical protection measures and an industry that fully understands and fulfils its responsibilities. This is reinforced by close cooperation on nuclear security issues between the regulator, the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission, federal and provincial law enforcement and intelligence agencies, the industry, foreign governments and international organizations. On 21 November 2013, Canada ratified the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism. On 3 December 2013, Canada ratified the 2005 Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials.

Action 41: Following a complete review, nuclear security regulations were amended in 2006 to further reinforce the physical protection of nuclear materials in Canada. Canadian physical protection measures include armed on-site response forces,

constant threat monitoring, enhanced security screening, a comprehensive drill and exercise programme, and robust perimeter protection. Physical protection in Canada is strengthened by a rigorous nuclear material accounting system that tracks nuclear materials, in line with Canada's international commitments.

Action 42: Canada ratified the 2005 Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials on 3 December 2013. We encourage all States in a position to do so to ratify the amendment as soon as possible.

Action 43: Canada remains committed to the IAEA Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources and its supplementary Guidance on the Import and Export of Radioactive Sources. Canada further encourages all States to implement the provisions of the Code and Guidance in a harmonized manner to assist in providing assurances that radioactive sources are used and maintained within an appropriate regulatory framework of radiation safety and security.

Action 44: Canada supports counter-proliferation initiatives such as Security Council resolution 1540 (2004), the Proliferation Security Initiative and the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. We regularly promote these efforts in multilateral forums, and work to advance these issues within, inter alia, the Group of Eight, the Organization of American States, the Regional Forum of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, the General Assembly and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). We encourage States that have not yet done so to join these initiatives, in order to strengthen the international counter-proliferation framework. Canada's Global Partnership Programme has a unit dedicated to resolution 1540 (2004) which has a number of projects under way, including delivering chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and explosives training to States that makes requests through the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004). Canada participates fully in the IAEA's Incident and Trafficking Database programme. Canada is also supporting regional workshops to build the capacity of States to adapt domestic legislation that would facilitate the ratification of international legal instruments related to the security of nuclear materials, such as the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials and its Amendment.

Canada continues to assess areas to improve its national capabilities to detect, deter and disrupt illicit trafficking in nuclear materials and has initiated a project to increase Canadian nuclear forensic capabilities. Canada has established effective domestic controls to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and their components, in accordance with its international legal obligations.

Action 45: Canada ratified the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism on 21 November 2013.

Action 46: Canada views a strong and cooperative State System of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Material as vital to the implementation of an effective safeguards system. The technical capabilities of a country's System and the nature and the scope of cooperation between that System and IAEA are two of the State-specific factors that IAEA considers when developing a State-level approach to safeguards. This allows for a more focused, adaptable safeguards system. Canada regularly advocates these views within various international forums and continues to work with IAEA in further developing the State-level safeguards concept.

Action 47: Canada possesses an indigenous nuclear power reactor system and a broad and diverse nuclear sector, and is a reliable supplier of uranium, nuclear equipment and technology, and radioisotopes.

Action 48: Canada strongly supports the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. In view of the inherent relationship between States' inalienable rights to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and the obligations contained elsewhere in the Treaty, cooperation by Canada with other countries in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy takes fully into account the non-proliferation credentials of the recipient country.

Action 49: Canada provides experts, equipment and technology through technical cooperation to many developing States parties. Canada has nuclear cooperation with developing countries; cooperation has included exports of nuclear power reactors, nuclear material and equipment.

Action 50: Canada strongly supports the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. In view of the inherent relationship between States' inalienable rights to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and the obligations contained elsewhere in the Treaty, cooperation by Canada with other countries in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy takes fully into account the non-proliferation credentials of the recipient country. Canada is a strong supporter of the IAEA's Technical Cooperation Programme and provides experts, equipment and technology through this Programme to developing States parties. Canada's exports of nuclear power reactors and equipment have been to developing countries.

Action 51: Canada is committed to working with other States and relevant international organizations on new arrangements for the supply of nuclear items, consistent with the balance of rights and obligations agreed to in the Treaty and in particular in articles I, II, III and IV. Canada currently has in place 29 nuclear cooperation agreements with 47 State parties to the Treaty. Most recently, Canada concluded an agreement with the United Arab Emirates and signed one with Kazakhstan.

Action 52: Canada is a strong supporter of the IAEA Technical Cooperation Programme. Canada is actively involved in the work and decisions of the IAEA Board of Governors Technical Assistance and Cooperation Committee, in addition to the annual negotiation and adoption of an IAEA General Conference resolution on the strengthening of technical cooperation. Canada contributes significant funding, equipment and expertise to the Agency's Technical Cooperation Programme and continues to encourage more focus on results, the dedication of more resources to project implementation and away from administration of the programme, in the first instance by fewer and larger technical cooperation projects. Canada further supports IAEA partnerships with other United Nations development agencies with a view to leveraging additional funding for technical cooperation project implementation.

Action 53: Canada strongly supports the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Canada also remains a strong supporter of and financial contributor to the IAEA's Technical Cooperation Programme. Canada provides experts, equipment and technology through technical cooperation to developing States parties. Canada's exports of nuclear power reactors and equipment have been to developing countries. Canada is actively involved in the work and decisions of the IAEA Board of Governors Technical Assistance and Cooperation Committee, in addition to the annual

negotiation and adoption of an IAEA General Conference resolution on the strengthening of technical cooperation.

Action 54: Canada believes strongly in the importance of the IAEA Technical Cooperation Fund and continues to contribute its assessed voluntary contribution. Canada also uses its IAEA Board of Governors Technical Assistance and Cooperation Committee membership to ensure better use of Technical Cooperation Fund resources.

Action 55: Canada supports the IAEA Peaceful Uses Initiative, including by providing in-kind resources to projects of the Initiative.

Action 56: Canada regularly contributes to projects under the IAEA Technical Cooperation Fund intended to support the training of the skilled workforce necessary for countries seeking to develop its own nuclear energy infrastructure. Canada drafts and introduces alternating, biennial IAEA General Conference resolutions on nuclear power infrastructure development and nuclear knowledge management.

Action 57: Canada ensures that the use of nuclear energy is consistent with its national legislation and respective international obligations in terms of nuclear safety, nuclear security and nuclear safeguards.

Action 58: Canada acknowledges the potential contribution that new mechanisms could make to help assure reliable access to nuclear fuel if they provide increased confidence to those seeking to develop or expand nuclear power capabilities. With this in view, Canada supported the decision of the IAEA Board of Governors to establish an IAEA low enriched uranium fuel bank and will continue to assess proposed fuel assurance mechanisms based on their individual merits.

Action 59: Canada is a party to the Convention on Nuclear Safety, the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident, the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency, the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management, the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials and its 2005 Amendment.

Action 60: The Fukushima nuclear crisis tested Canadian abilities to respond to serious nuclear safety accidents, and we were able to offer a significant package of expertise and assistance to Japan. Canadian nuclear and health experts produced daily assessments and modelling of the situation, developed a recommended precautionary evacuation zone for Canadians, and provided daily analysis of the worst-case scenarios to guide policy. Canada has also been contributing to the development of the IAEA's comprehensive report on the Fukushima accident in providing leadership and expertise on various areas that will be covered in the report. Canada is also actively participating in the IAEA's Emergency Preparedness and Response Expert Group to strengthen the international nuclear emergency management framework. Canada supports and strongly encourages peer reviews by the IAEA's Integrated Regulatory Review Service to share best practices in the area of nuclear safety. Peer reviews compare a country's regulatory practices with international standards and equivalent good practices elsewhere in the world. Canada encourages other countries to conduct these missions, follow-up on their recommendations and make their report publicly available. Canada is strongly

supportive of initiatives undertaken by the leadership of the Sixth Review Meeting of the Convention on Nuclear Safety to improve the international legal framework on nuclear safety through the strengthening of the Convention and its supporting guidance documents.

With respect to nuclear security, Canada continues to actively assist in the further development of the IAEA Nuclear Security Series to assist and promote international recommendations and guidance in this area. In recognition of their importance, Canada continues to contribute experts to assist in the development of the Nuclear Security Series, particularly the Nuclear Security Fundamentals and the three recommendation level documents within the series which provide the basis for the series technical and implementing guides. Canada has provided experts to IAEA International Physical Protection Advisory Service teams to further assist in this area. Canada has requested the Service to review and assess the effectiveness of its security regime. Canada further actively supports the World Institute for Nuclear Security and has assisted with co-hosting three conferences of the Institute in Canada to date and has participated in other conferences resulting in the Institute's best practices guides being produced.

Action 61: At the 2010 Nuclear Security Summit in Washington, D.C., Canada committed to work with the United States to repatriate spent, United States-origin, highly enriched uranium fuel that is currently stored at Chalk River Laboratories by the end of 2018. Canada's first shipment of spent highly enriched uranium fuel was successfully returned to the United States in 2010, and a second shipment was repatriated in 2012. At the March 2012 Nuclear Security Summit in Seoul, Canada agreed to work with the United States to repatriate additional non-fuel highly enriched uranium materials stored at Chalk River Laboratories by 2018. Canada intends to cease isotope production using highly enriched uranium targets by 2016, and has invested $60 million to support the development of alternative isotope production technologies that do not use uranium.

Action 62: Canada transports radioactive materials consistent with relevant international standards of safety, security and environmental protection. Transport regulations are based on the IAEA's Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Materials. Canada is in the process of updating its transport regulations to refer to the latest edition of the IAEA Transport Regulations.

Action 63: On 3 December 2013, the Minister of State (Foreign Affairs and Consular), signed the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage on behalf of Canada. On 29 January 2014, the Nuclear Liability and Compensation Act was introduced in Canada's parliament to modernize Canada's nuclear liability compensation framework. The proposed legislation will increase the civil liability limit of a nuclear power plant operator to C$1 billion dollars, an amount in line with international standards. It will also include authority for Canada to ratify the Convention.

Action 64: Canada notes and reaffirms the consensus reached at the Fifty-Third General Conference of IAEA that any armed attack on and threat against safeguarded nuclear facilities devoted to peaceful purposes constitutes a violation of the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, international law and the Statute of IAEA.

Preparatory Committee for the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

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Steps to promote the achievement of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East and the realization of the goals and objectives of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East

Report submitted by Canada

1. At the sixty-eighth session of the General Assembly, Canada supported a resolution calling for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East (resolution 68/27). In addition, Canada voted in favour of a resolution entitled "Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: accelerating the implementation of nuclear disarmament commitments" (resolution 68/39) which, inter alia, called upon States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to work towards the full implementation of the resolution on the Middle East adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. In resolution 68/39, the Assembly also recognized the endorsement by the 2010 Review Conference of practical steps in a process leading to the full implementation of the 1995 resolution, including the convening of a conference to be attended by all States of the region on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction. Canada voted against a resolution entitled "The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East" (resolution 68/65). As expressed in Canada's explanation of its vote, the resolution unfairly singled out Israel by calling for its accession to the Treaty while failing to address serious nuclear non-compliance issues by States in the region, particularly the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Syrian Arab Republic.

2. Canada is committed to advancing the outcomes of the 2010 Review Conference, including the holding of a conference on a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East. Canada fully supports the ongoing efforts of the facilitator of the conference, the Finnish Ambassador Jaakko Laajava, to consult broadly with all relevant stakeholders to ensure a successful conference to be attended by all States in the region on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at. Any zone free of weapons of mass destruction should be negotiated by States in the region for States in the region, with support from other actors as requested. In this regard, we welcome the recent consultations that have taken place in Glion and Geneva, Switzerland.

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3. Canada has called for universal and full adherence and compliance with the Treaty by States in the Middle East. At the 2005 and 2006 General Conferences of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Canada actively supported the adoption of a resolution on the application of IAEA safeguards in the Middle East. Canada regrets that it was unable to support this annual resolution from 2007 to 2013, given that changes presented by the drafters were not the result of a consensual approach and because the resolution did not address serious breaches in compliance with Treaty safeguards requirements by the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Syrian Arab Republic, as determined by IAEA and reported by it to the Security Council. Canada welcomes the fact that all States parties to the Treaty in the region have ratified a comprehensive safeguards agreement with IAEA. Canada has appealed to all States in the region to contribute further to regional stability and security by concluding additional protocols to their respective comprehensive safeguards agreements, which Canada considers the current verification standard pursuant to article III of the Treaty. We congratulate Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates for having fully in force additional protocols with IAEA.

4. With regard to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, Canada co-sponsored resolution 68/68 on the Treaty at the sixty-eighth session of the General Assembly, and has also encouraged all States in the region, particularly those listed in annex 2 of the Treaty, to ratify the Treaty as a confidence- and security-building measure.

5. Canada shares the international community's serious concerns about the scope and nature of the Islamic Republic of Iran's nuclear programme and its ongoing failure to meet its safeguards obligations. Although Canada recognizes that, like all States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Islamic Republic of Iran has the right to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, this right comes with obligations with which all States, including the Islamic Republic of Iran, must comply. The Islamic Republic of Iran has lost the confidence of the IAEA Board of Governors and the Security Council through its two-decade-long history of concealing nuclear activities. In the light of this track record and the country's failure to provide any plausible justification for its efforts to acquire the full nuclear fuel cycle, Canada fully supports Security Council resolutions 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008), 1835 (2008) and 1929 (2010) and IAEA Board of Governors resolutions GOV/2009/82, GOV/2011/65 and GOV/2012/50. These resolutions express the international community's desire for a negotiated, diplomatic solution that respects the Islamic Republic of Iran's right to peaceful uses of nuclear energy while ensuring the exclusively peaceful nature of the country's nuclear programme.

6. The Islamic Republic of Iran is in non-compliance with its comprehensive safeguards agreement and is in violation of six Security Council resolutions and 12 IAEA Board of Governors resolutions. While Canada notes the confirmation of IAEA that the Islamic Republic of Iran has so far implemented all of its required actions under the November 2013 Joint Plan of Action — including the suspension of uranium-235 enrichment above 5 per cent and downblending its stock of 20-per-cent-enriched uranium — this agreement is only a short-term measure intended to facilitate a comprehensive solution. Canada firmly believes that a comprehensive solution will require all outstanding issues to be resolved. Notably, the Islamic Republic of Iran continues to be the only State with a comprehensive safeguards agreement in force that refuses to implement the modified Code 3.1 provisions of its

subsidiary arrangements, in violation of its safeguards agreement. It continues to refuse to provide sufficient information about the original purpose and chronology of the Fordow fuel enrichment plant, as well as about the majority of its other nuclear facilities. Furthermore, the Islamic Republic of Iran is required by binding resolutions of the Board of Governors and the Security Council to take steps towards the full implementation of its safeguards agreement and an additional protocol. It has failed to do so. As such, IAEA is not in a position to provide credible assurances about the absence of undeclared nuclear activities in the Islamic Republic of Iran or to confirm that all nuclear material in the country is being used for exclusively peaceful purposes.

7. Canada has previously made it clear that for the Islamic Republic of Iran to regain its place in the global community, it must resolve all non-compliance issues. Chief among these are the possible military dimensions of its nuclear research, as outlined in the annex to the IAEA Director General's report of November 2011 (GOV/2011/65) — research which can only be understood in the context of a nuclear weapons development programme. The Islamic Republic of Iran has stated publicly that it would like to resolve all concerns relating to its nuclear programme within a year. To achieve this goal, the country will need to accelerate the rate of cooperation with IAEA under the framework for cooperation established in November 2013. Canada notes that the Islamic Republic of Iran and IAEA have proceeded to a second round of practical measures under the framework, and that the first six measures were implemented satisfactorily within the agreed three-month period. Canada stresses that IAEA must clarify and confirm all information provided by the Islamic Republic of Iran and that these measures should not be seen as static or fixed requirements, but rather as elements in an ongoing process intended to provide IAEA with a complete understanding of the country's nuclear programme. In this regard, we expect the Islamic Republic of Iran to cooperate fully and answer all questions posed by IAEA. From Canada's perspective, the practical measures agreed to by IAEA and the Islamic Republic of Iran in the next phase of the framework will demonstrate clearly the seriousness with which that country views the current process, and whether or not it truly intends to resolve all outstanding concerns about the possible military dimensions of its nuclear programme.

8. Canada remains deeply concerned about findings that point to possible undeclared nuclear material, facilities and activities in the Syrian Arab Republic, and also about possible nuclear cooperation between the Syrian Arab Republic and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Canada fully supported the Board of Governors resolution GOV/2011/41 requesting the IAEA Director-General to report to the Security Council the assessment that an undeclared nuclear reactor existed at Dair Alzour, in breach of the Syrian Arab Republic's safeguards obligations. Despite the current security situation in the Syrian Arab Republic, IAEA continues to report that the Assad regime has failed to provide the necessary cooperation needed to address the country's outstanding compliance issues. We continue to call on the Syrian Arabic Republic to urgently remedy its non-compliance and to meet its own commitment to "fully cooperate with the Agency to resolve related outstanding issues" (GOV/INF/2011/10), so that IAEA can provide the necessary assurances as to the exclusively peaceful nature of the country's nuclear programme. Local authorities must be ready to provide access to sites as requested by IAEA. We also continue to urge the Syrian Arab Republic to bring into force an additional protocol as soon as possible. It is only through full, transparent and proactive cooperation

with IAEA that the Syrian Arab Republic can restore confidence with respect to the scope and nature of its nuclear programme.

9. Canada has called on all remaining States not parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to join as non-nuclear-weapon States. As a confidence-building measure in advance of this ultimate goal, Canada has also called upon these same States to separate civilian and military fuel cycles and to place all civilian nuclear activities under IAEA safeguards. These statements are in conformity with both the policies and actions of Canada, which include Canada's voting record on the resolutions at the sixty-eighth session of the General Assembly, as referenced in the first paragraph of the present report.

10. Canada recognizes the growing interest in nuclear energy among States parties in the Middle East and welcomes the announcements made by a number of such States concerning new initiatives in this field. In welcoming these initiatives, we note that all nuclear power programmes should be accompanied by the strongest commitments to nuclear non-proliferation, nuclear safety and nuclear security.

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Preparatory Committee for the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

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Implementation of article VI

Report submitted by the Islamic Republic of Iran

1. The present report is submitted in accordance with action 20 of the action plan on nuclear disarmament adopted at the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and deals with measures that have been taken by the Islamic Republic of Iran to implement article VI of the Treaty; paragraph 4 (c) of the 1995 decision on principles and objectives for nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation; the practical steps agreed to in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference; and the action plan on nuclear disarmament adopted at the 2010 Review Conference, taking into account the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice of 8 July 1996.

2. The Islamic Republic of Iran believes that reporting, as envisaged in actions 5 and 20 of the action plan, provides an essential element to ascertain the status of implementation of obligations assumed under article VI of the Treaty. The Islamic Republic of Iran holds the view that the objectivity of our analysis on the progress towards the goal of nuclear disarmament would be best served through the adoption of a format that properly defines the categories of information required within the review process.

3. One of the important elements of action 20 that needs to be taken into account in reporting is the advisory opinion of 8 July 1996 of the International Court of Justice. As the Court stipulated in that advisory opinion, the threat or use of nuclear weapons would generally be contrary to the rules of international law, and there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control. The Islamic Republic of Iran emphasizes the importance and validity of the advisory opinion as a universal disarmament obligation of States parties to the Treaty and, accordingly, believes that, while reporting on the implementation of article VI of the Treaty is important, it shall not substitute for the fulfilment of the obligation for nuclear disarmament under article VI. It is disappointing that, more than four decades after the entry into force of the Treaty, the obligations under article VI have yet to be fulfilled. More than 60 years after the tragedies of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the long-lasting threat to human survival from

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nuclear weapons continues to be the greatest one to humanity. The international community is gravely concerned about the lack of progress in achieving nuclear disarmament. Unfortunately, long after the end of the cold war, more than 20,000 nuclear weapons still exist, many on high-alert status and ready to use.

Approach of the Islamic Republic of Iran towards the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

4. The Islamic Republic of Iran signed and ratified the Treaty in 1969 and 1970, respectively. In June 1973, in accordance with article III (1) of the Treaty, the Islamic Republic of Iran concluded a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The ratification of the Treaty before its entry into force and early conclusion of the safeguards agreement clearly demonstrate the long-standing support and commitment of the Islamic Republic of Iran as a non-nuclear-weapon State to this fundamental instrument.

5. In 1974, the Islamic Republic of Iran was the first country in the Middle East region to initiate the idea of establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone, which was followed vigorously by subsequent resolutions of the General Assembly. In 2012, the Islamic Republic of Iran also officially declared its readiness to participate in a conference on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East.

6. The Islamic Republic of Iran has fulfilled its obligations under all the provisions of the Treaty with the aim of helping the integrity and universality of the Treaty regime and achieving its fundamental objectives. The policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran to renounce the nuclear option as a matter of principle and to place its peaceful nuclear facilities under IAEA full-scope safeguards is a clear manifestation of its commitment to the Treaty. The Islamic Republic of Iran considers the acquiring, the development and the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons to be inhuman, immoral, illegal and against its very basic principles. Nuclear weapons have no place in the defence doctrine of the Islamic Republic of Iran, because of our commitment to our obligations under the Treaty. Moreover, the Islamic Republic of Iran believes that nuclear weapons do not increase its security.

7. In the view of the Islamic Republic of Iran, all the provisions of the Treaty are of equal importance. Maintaining the balance of the rights and obligations enshrined in the Treaty preserves its integrity, enhances its credibility and encourages its universality and its full and non-discriminatory implementation. In this context, the Islamic Republic of Iran believes that the current selective, discriminatory and imbalanced approach towards the Treaty, reflected in particular in the decision of the Nuclear Suppliers Group on nuclear cooperation with non-parties to the Treaty, the instrumental use of the Security Council by some veto-holders and the adoption of the legally flawed Council resolutions, has seriously jeopardized the basis of the Treaty.

8. In accordance with the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference, the nuclear-weapon States made an unequivocal undertaking to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals. As agreed in the 2000 Review Conference and action plan on nuclear disarmament and adopted at the 2010 Review Conference, practical steps for the systematic and progressive implementation of article VI of the Treaty should be vigorously pursued by nuclear-weapon States. In this context, no action shall be made by nuclear-weapon States in contravention of those obligations. Regrettably, and despite the pledges on nuclear disarmament made by the current

Administration of the United States of America, a review of the existing United States nuclear policy shows a reverse trend. The continued emphasis by the United States Nuclear Posture Review on maintaining nuclear weapons and the obsolete deterrence policy; the plan to spend $700 billion on the modernization of the United States nuclear arsenal and construction of a new nuclear weapon production facility; no movement towards ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty; and the raising of new excuses for keeping nuclear weapons in the new Nuclear Posture Review, are clear indications of the continued policy of the United States to evade its obligation to eliminate its nuclear arsenal. Furthermore, the Trident project of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to build a new generation of nuclear-armed submarines and the announced policy of France to modernize all branches of its nuclear forces, including producing new nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines, by spending more than €350 billion until 2020, are all flagrant violations of international law, namely, obligations under article VI of the Treaty and the 1995 decision on principles and objectives for nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, as well as the commitments made by the nuclear-weapon States at the 2000 and 2010 Review Conferences.

9. Another negative development in the framework of joint research on nuclear warheads between two nuclear-weapon States, the United Kingdom and the United States, constitutes a serious case of non-compliance with article I of the Treaty. According to the data published on 9 February 2009, the United States military has been using an atomic weapons facility in the United Kingdom to carry out research into its own warhead programme. In this regard, the United States defence officials have declared that "very valuable" warhead research has been taking place at the Atomic Weapons Establishment in Aldermaston, United Kingdom, as part of an ongoing and secretive deal between the Governments of the United Kingdom and the United States. Such events clearly demonstrate the non-compliance of both countries and their reluctance in discharging their legal obligations under the Treaty provisions.

10. The States parties to the Treaty are also concerned about the efforts of some nuclear-weapon States to reinterpret article VI of the Treaty and to make their obligations conditional, including the statements by the representative of the United States to the First Committee of the General Assembly at its sixty-second session and that of the United Kingdom Secretary for Defence in February 2008 at the Conference on Disarmament. In response to such positions, it should be indicated that the International Court of Justice has provided an authoritative interpretation of article VI of the Treaty, holding that it requires the nuclear-weapon States to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control. Moreover, the unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States to eliminate their nuclear arsenals, as reflected in the consensual Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference of the Treaty, has already clarified the meaning of article VI of the Treaty.

11. In addition, the United States has continuously refrained from giving a positive response to the repeated demand of the international community to start negotiations on a nuclear weapons convention. Instead, the United States is increasingly devoting billions of dollars to programmes of vertical proliferation of its nuclear arsenal. Furthermore, by continuing to deploy hundreds of nuclear weapons and global missile defence systems in other countries and training the air forces of those

countries to deliver nuclear weapons in the framework of military alliances, transferring nuclear technology and materials to non-parties to the Treaty whose nuclear facilities operate outside of IAEA full-scope safeguards monitoring, the United States is in non-compliance with article I of the Treaty, which stipulates that each nuclear-weapon State undertakes not to transfer nuclear weapons to any recipient whatsoever. Such actions also constitute non-compliance with article VI of the Treaty and the measures agreed to at the 1995, 2000 and 2010 Review Conferences.

12. It should be highlighted that, in accordance with step 5 of the 13 practical steps of the 2000 Review Conference and action 2 of the action plan on nuclear disarmament of the 2010 Review Conference, any reduction of nuclear weapons, whether strategic or non-strategic, should be made in an internationally verifiable and irreversible manner. Needless to say, a reduction in nuclear weapons can never be a substitute for the main obligation of nuclear-weapon States, namely, the total elimination of their nuclear weapons. Since there is no mechanism to internationally verify the unilateral, bilateral and multilateral declarations or agreements regarding the fulfilment of nuclear disarmament obligations, the Review Conference should establish a standing committee for monitoring and verifying the implementation of the commitments of the nuclear-weapon States under article VI of the Treaty.

Measures taken to implement article VI of the Treaty

13. The Islamic Republic of Iran continues to actively participate in international efforts to promote nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. Initiatives taken towards this noble goal have always enjoyed our full support. In this regard, in 2013 the Islamic Republic of Iran introduced General Assembly resolution 68/35 on follow-up to nuclear disarmament obligations agreed to at the 1995, 2000 and 2010 Review Conferences of the Parties to the Treaty. By adopting this resolution, the Assembly, inter alia, called for all the nuclear-weapon States to take the following practical steps, which would lead to nuclear disarmament:

(a) Further efforts to be made by the nuclear-weapon States to reduce their nuclear arsenals unilaterally;

(b) Increased transparency by the nuclear-weapon States with regard to nuclear weapons capabilities and the implementation of agreements pursuant to article VI of the Treaty and as a voluntary confidence-building measure to support further progress in nuclear disarmament;

(c) The further reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons, based on unilateral initiatives and as an integral part of the nuclear arms reduction and disarmament process;

(d) Concrete agreed measures to reduce further the operational status of nuclear weapons systems;

(e) A diminishing role for nuclear weapons in security policies so as to minimize the risk that these weapons will ever be used and to facilitate the process of their total elimination;

(f) The engagement, as soon as appropriate, of all the nuclear-weapon States in the process leading to the total elimination of their nuclear weapons.

14. During the sixty-eighth session of the General Assembly, and based on its principled position, the Islamic Republic of Iran voted in favour of the resolutions promoting nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

15. In order to promote the cause of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, the Islamic Republic of Iran has held two international conferences on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, which took place in Tehran on 17 and 18 April 2010 and 12 and 13 June 2011, at which the current challenges to the implementation of nuclear disarmament commitments were examined and mechanisms to realize the lofty goal of a nuclear-weapon-free world were sought.

16. Along with the other members of the Non-Aligned Movement, the Islamic Republic of Iran has in various forums, including the International Court of Justice, made its position clear that the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons is contrary to international law, in particular international humanitarian law, and is therefore inhuman, immoral and illegal. The Islamic Republic of Iran has continuously supported the resolution adopted annually since 1999, on follow-up to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons. In this context, the Islamic Republic of Iran has participated in the conferences on the humanitarian impacts of nuclear weapons, held in 2013 in Oslo and in 2014 in Nayarit, Mexico, respectively.

17. In pursuance of its long-standing principled position in support of nuclear disarmament, the President of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Hassan Rouhani, participated in the first ever high-level meeting of the General Assembly on nuclear disarmament, on 26 September 2013, and presented, on behalf of the 120 States members of the Non-Aligned Movement, a three-point proposal on nuclear disarmament. The proposal was supported by many of the representatives of political and geographical groups, Member States and civil society participating in that meeting and was subsequently adopted by the General Assembly in its resolution 68/32 on follow-up to the 2013 high-level meeting of the Assembly on nuclear disarmament. Through that resolution, the Assembly:

(a) Called for the urgent commencement of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament for the early conclusion of a comprehensive convention on nuclear weapons to prohibit their possession, development, production, acquisition, testing, stockpiling, transfer, use or threat of use and to provide for their destruction;

(b) Decided to convene, no later than 2018, a United Nations high-level international conference on nuclear disarmament to review the progress made in that regard;

(c) Declared 26 September as the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons devoted to furthering that objective, including through enhancing public awareness and education about the threat posed to humanity by nuclear weapons and the necessity for their total elimination, in order to mobilize international efforts towards achieving the common goal of a nuclear-weapon-free world.

18. The Islamic Republic of Iran fully supports the early establishment of an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament as soon as possible and as the highest priority, in the Conference on Disarmament, to start negotiations on a phased programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons within a specified framework of time, in the context of a comprehensive nuclear weapons convention.

Negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear weapons convention must lead to the legal prohibition, once and for all, of the possession, the development, the testing, the stockpiling and the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons by any country and under all circumstances and provide for the total destruction of such inhuman weapons. Until the conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear weapons convention, the nuclear-weapon States must fulfil their obligations under the Treaty and refrain, in particular, from:

(a) Any kind of development and research on nuclear weapons;

(b) Any threat to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States;

(c) Any modernization of nuclear weapons and their facilities;

(d) Deployment of nuclear weapons in the territories of other countries;

(e) Maintaining their nuclear weapons in the trigger-alert situation.

19. Owing to the significant role that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones plays in achieving a world entirely free from nuclear weapons, in 1974 the Islamic Republic of Iran presented the idea of establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East and submitted a resolution on the subject to the General Assembly. Since 1982, the resolution has been adopted annually by consensus in the Assembly. However, the Zionist regime, through its persistent rejection of accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, remains the main and only obstacle to the establishment of such a zone.

Preparatory Committee for the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

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Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East

Report submitted by the Islamic Republic of Iran pursuant to section IV, paragraph 9, of the conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions adopted at the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons[1]

1. Article VII of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons has underlined the importance of the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones through the recognition of "the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories". The Islamic Republic of Iran, while welcoming the efforts aimed at establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones in all regions of the world, attaches great importance to and strongly supports the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. In order to achieve the goal of establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in this important region and realizing the goals and objectives of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East that were supported in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty and in the conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions adopted at the 2010 Review Conference, the Islamic Republic of Iran reports the following.

2. The idea of the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East was first presented by Iran in 1974. Since 1982, the General Assembly has annually adopted a consensus resolution on this issue, which indeed is indicative of the strong and continuous global support for the establishment of such a zone.

Israeli nuclear-weapon programme as the main and only obstacle to the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East

3. Currently, there is only one non-party to the Treaty in the Middle East, which is the Israeli regime. Despite repeated calls by the international community, demonstrated in particular in the resolution on the Middle East adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty and in related

[1] NPT/CONF.2010/50 (Vol. I).

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resolutions of the General Assembly, the General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, the Zionist regime has neither acceded to the Treaty nor placed its unwarranted nuclear facilities under IAEA full-scope safeguards. It has continued to refuse even to declare its intention to accede to the Treaty. Its nuclear weapons and unsafeguarded nuclear activities, as well as its persistent refusal to join the international legally binding instruments banning weapons of mass destruction, seriously threaten regional and international peace and security and endanger the non-proliferation regime.

4. The 2000 and 2010 Review Conferences reaffirmed the importance of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East. Owing to the significant provisions of that resolution, the Islamic Republic of Iran truly believes that the resolution should be implemented swiftly, especially by the Russian Federation, the United States of America and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, as sponsors of the resolution and depositories of the Treaty. Based on the package agreed to at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, they have the main responsibility for taking concrete steps to implement their commitments under this resolution.

5. The 2000 Review Conference reaffirmed "the importance of Israel's accession to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the placement of all its nuclear facilities under comprehensive IAEA safeguards, in realizing the goal of universal adherence to the Treaty in the Middle East". Unconditional accession of the Zionist regime to the Treaty and the conclusion of a full-scope safeguards agreement with IAEA would undoubtedly pave the way for the realization of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. Neglecting the commitments undertaken by States parties to the Treaty with the adoption of this important resolution can only embolden that regime to continue to remain a source of threat and instability in the Middle East by flouting the aspirations of the international community and remaining outside the Treaty and the full-scope safeguards regime. In this context, we believe that some of the national reports submitted do not address the negative implications of the Zionist regime's intransigence with respect to joining the Treaty and are not as effective as they ought to be with regard to the 1995 resolution on the Middle East.

6. In implementing its obligations under articles II and III of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, all nuclear facilities of the Islamic Republic of Iran are devoted to peaceful purposes and are under the full-scope safeguards of IAEA. Furthermore, contributing to the realization of a world free from weapons of mass destruction, the Islamic Republic of Iran has signed the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Biological Weapons Convention and the 1925 Geneva Protocol. Its high record of accession, among the Middle Eastern countries, to the non-proliferation and disarmament instruments is a clear manifestation of its firm commitment to the cause of disarmament and non-proliferation, as well as to the realization of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East.

7. The Islamic Republic of Iran, in its bilateral and multilateral dialogues with other States parties to the Treaty, has always urged their active contribution towards the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. In order to promote the cause of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, the Islamic Republic of Iran also held two international conferences on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation in Tehran, in 2010 and 2011, which, inter alia, examined ways and means of realizing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. Many

participants in those conferences identified the nuclear-weapon programme of the Zionist regime as the main challenge and the only obstacle to the establishment of such a zone.

8. Unfortunately, the inaction imposed upon the Security Council over the past several decades in addressing the well-documented nuclear-weapon programme of the Zionist regime has given that regime the audacity to explicitly acknowledge possession of nuclear weapons, as divulged by its former Prime Minister in an interview on German television on 12 December 2006, contradicting the long-sought idea of the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. Moreover, the regime's development and possession of nuclear weapons not only violate basic principles of international law, the Charter of the United Nations, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and numerous General Assembly, Security Council and IAEA General Conference resolutions, but also clearly defy the demands and concerns of the overwhelming majority of the States Members of the United Nations and constantly and obstinately disregard the international community, which has, time and again, called upon this regime to renounce nuclear weapons and accede to the Treaty. Over and above the foregoing, the Non-Aligned Movement, in its statement dated 5 February 2007, expressed its great concern over the acquisition of nuclear capability by the Zionist regime, which poses a serious and continuing threat to the security of neighbouring and other States, and condemned that regime for its action and the aforementioned statement in this regard, and for continuing to develop and stockpile nuclear arsenals.

9. The brutal attacks and acts of aggression by the Israeli regime against its neighbours and its refusal of the repeated calls by the international community to stop breaching international norms and principles are all evidence of the grave threat posed by such an aggressive regime. Needless to say, nuclear weapons in the hands of such a regime could significantly endanger regional and international peace and security. This regime is the only one with the dark record of attacking nuclear facilities of the States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and it continues to threaten to attack the IAEA-safeguarded peaceful nuclear facilities of other States in the region.

10. The Security Council should fulfil its Charter-based responsibility to address such a clear and serious threat to international peace and security and take prompt and appropriate action accordingly. Indeed, peace and stability cannot be achieved in the Middle East while the massive nuclear arsenal of this regime continues to threaten the region and beyond. In this context, the resolutions of the IAEA General Conference on the nuclear capabilities of the Zionist regime and the application of IAEA safeguards in the Middle East should be recalled. Those resolutions are additional manifestations of the international concern about the threat posed to regional and international peace and security by the nuclear-weapon programme of this regime, which is the only obstacle to the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East.

11. The Islamic Republic of Iran is of the opinion that, pending the realization of the nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, no country of the region must acquire or maintain nuclear weapons or permit the stationing of nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices on its territory or territory under its jurisdiction or control. They should also refrain from taking actions that run counter to both the letter and the spirit of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and contradict the resolutions

and consensus outcome documents of the Review Conferences, as well as the resolutions of the United Nations and the IAEA General Conference relating to the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East.

12. The Islamic Republic of Iran believes that the Review Conferences have a significant role in the realization of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. The 2015 Review Conference should establish a subsidiary body under Main Committee II to consider this issue and make concrete recommendations on urgent and practical steps for the implementation of the resolution on the Middle East adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, as well as the measures contained in the Final Document and the conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions adopted at the 2000 and 2010 Review Conferences, respectively. Iran believes that the implementation of relevant measures contained in the conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions adopted at the 2010 Review Conference, particularly the recommendation that an international conference be convened in 2012 by the Secretary-General and the co-sponsors of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East, at the earliest date in 2014, should lead to the prompt and unconditional accession of the Zionist regime of Israel to the Treaty as a non-nuclear-weapon party. Consistent with its long-standing policy on and commitment to the idea of the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, Iran has been positively engaged in consultations conducted by the Finnish facilitator of the conference. Iran also officially declared its readiness to participate in the Conference in 2012 before the date for the convening of such Conference, which was scheduled to be held in late 2012 in Helsinki. That declaration still remains valid. Iran calls upon the conveners and the facilitator to set a date for the convening of the conference at the earliest possible time and not later than the end of 2014. As a matter of fact, it was no surprise to Iran that the planned Helsinki conference was cancelled owing to the opposition of the Israeli regime. In this context, it would be unrealistic to hope for an improvement in the prospects for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East as long as the Israeli regime's hypocritical policy on nuclear weapons and the United States policy of exempting Israel from international non-proliferation regime remain unaltered.

13. The Islamic Republic of Iran is of the firm belief that an agreed plan of action and timetable for the universality of the Treaty in the Middle East should be a top priority on the agenda of all parties to the Treaty, in particular the nuclear-weapon States, as well as all efforts and initiatives aiming at establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. To that end, there should be sustained pressure on the Zionist regime to accede to the Treaty, without any delay or condition, as a non-nuclear-weapon party, and to place all its nuclear facilities under IAEA comprehensive safeguards in order to pave the way for the long-sought goal of the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. Should the Conference on a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East be convened in the future, it shall be dealt with as a subsidiary forum of the Review Conference process and therefore should follow its procedures.

14. In support of the rights of States parties under article VII of the Treaty, and in order to facilitate the implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East as well as the agreements reached at the 2000 and 2010 Review Conferences, the Islamic Republic of Iran is of the view that all States parties to the Treaty, in particular the nuclear-weapon States, especially the co-sponsors of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East, should continue to report on the implementation of

the resolution, through the United Nations Secretariat, to the President of the Review Conference, as well as to the Chairs of its Preparatory Committee meetings, as agreed at the 2000 and 2010 Review Conferences.

15. The Review Conference should also establish a standing committee to monitor the implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East and the agreements of the 2000 and 2010 Review Conferences in this regard, and to report thereon to the States parties to the Treaty.